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Life in the City |
Crime in the City |
Life in the Community |
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Life in the City "The Journal" ― ©Past, Present...Future? Herein is described Life in the City experienced by high-rise dwellers who acquired ownership interests of up to $500,000 in an upscale condominium community―and then saw those interests internally and externally downscaled to as low as $100,000. This, as the result of 1) a developer's erratic pricing and marketing 2) a board's unilateral, ill-advised and lengthy litigation against the developer 3) a still ongoing and devastating downturn in pricing, lending, buying and selling―as well as 4) ongoing, unwise and risk laden administration by an entrenched board. The latter, while advised by poorly managed, waste prone and self-protective contractors―as well as by self-protective risk management attorneys and poorly selected, self-protective risk management companies. The latter are often staffed with individuals who have little if any formal education at the university level, and even less professional education. While 1&2 are essentially ills of the past, their toxic effects linger in the present―thereby compounding the ongoing adverse impact of the ills associated with 3&4. If not viewed through the commonsense prism of fresh board administration―these ills are simply going to preside over depressed prices well into the future. During the early years of the housing downturn, a 5% board (without a vote of the remaining 95% of the association) brought litigation against a developer for "defects" that apparently turned out to be at best, debatable, and at worst, questionable―i.e., ranging from minor and easily curable deferred maintenance to costly and unnecessary new work that altered the building's original design. On the other hand, an obvious but cost prohibitive defect apparently did not surface during the course of the inspection leading to the litigation. Simultaneous with the preceding, mortgage lenders essentially brought buying and selling of homes to a halt by withholding mortgage loan funds form potential purchasers―the litigation being their major excuse for doing so. In the end, the litigation netted a mere fraction of the proceeds of the private out-of-court settlement (after legal and other litigation related expenses). To this day, the actual terms of the private settlement have never been made available to the remaining 95% of the association. Under normal circumstances, the term "market value" is a relative one. The circumstances of the massive U.S. economic downturn are far from normal, however. As a matter of fact conditions are so far from normal, that "market value" can be said to have little if any meaning at all these days. Those who have unsuccessfully attempted to sell heir homes over the past four years can attest to the preceding. After all, if a home cannot be sold, it can very well be said to have little if any "market value" at all―and certainly no real value beyond the utility that it provides to its resident owner occupant or the income that it provides to its absentee landlord. And "assessed value" has no real basis in fact. Unfortunately, however, the old adage about "death and taxes" remains as valid today as it ever did, i.e., both are "certain". Any recovery of the housing market will no doubt take many years―and then, only when the market bottoms out. It is anyone's guess when that will happen―considering the hundreds of thousands of homes presently in the foreclosure pipeline. In the meantime, lenders who once made 110% loans now refuse to lend at all to the vast majority of loan applicants. Without the once steady flow of residential financing, the typical home buyer cannot buy. This means, of course, that the typical home seller cannot sell. One bright spot perhaps, is that over the next 18 years or so, South Downtown is planned to add some 30 million square feet of new floor space in the Brewery District, Dome District and along the Foss Waterway and at the University of Washington. This planned development is part of what is expected to support a future increase of 60,000 new jobs and 70,000 new residents over the next two decades. |
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Life in the Community "The Journal" ― ©Board v. Condominium Herein is described Life in the Community experienced by high-rise dwellers who acquired ownership interests of up to $500,000 in an upscale condominium community―and then saw those interests internally and externally downscaled to as low as $100,000. The tallest condominium in the city―together with its well chosen hilltop site―dominates the skyline of the southern end of the downtown. Most of this condominium community's homes enjoy a spectacular view of some combination of 1) the city's downtown skyline along Pacific Avenue (including the Brewery District, Foss Waterway & University of Washington) 2) the port on Puget Sound's Commencement Bay 3) the entertainment center south of the port (Dome District) and 4) the Olympic and Cascade Mountains―to include Mount Rainier. Commuters benefit from a live traffic picture of the local north-south I-5 interstate freeway interchange in the gorge below. Automobile access to said interchange is about 2 minutes away. The condominium is a 14-story, reinforced-concrete building situated within 2-5 minutes driving time of 1) intra-city Link 2) intercity/inter-county Sounder and 3) interstate Amtrak passenger railway stations and services. The building represents but a single window on a myriad of inadvisable 110% loans the lending industry simply gave away to unqualified borrowers, i.e., those who couldn't make the usual down payment of 5%, 10% or 20%―or even defray the cost of their home loan's settlement costs (the latter almost always being folded into the loan). What followed these high risk and more or less potentially worthless loans were lenders' built-in escalations in interest rates. From the latter point on, there ensued the long slow slide of borrowers' inevitable and unavoidable 1) failure to make payments 2) 110% refinances 3) "underwater" loans 4) foreclosures 5) distress sales (including "short" sales). Then, "enter stage right" the 6) absentee landlord investors 7) the latter's downscale tenants and finally 8) downscale resident ownership―6, 7 and 8 all looking for deals as low as a mere $100,000 coming out of the misfortune of the original borrowers and purchasers of $300,000-$400,000 homes. Foreclosed borrowers often lost their jobs. But to a large degree, foreclosures were inevitable simply because 110% borrowers did not have their own money at risk, i.e., 0% down payments and $0 settlement costs. It is a given that when only the lender's money is at risk, a borrower's temptation to simply walk away from a loan is just too great―"strategic foreclosure" being what the current generation likes to call it. The borrower is relieved of the debt, but ends up with a low credit rating and an inability to acquire a home loan for 7 years or more afterward. But 5% of the total owners, the members of the board of directors each has a fractional ownership interest in the condominium community. Condominium associations traditionally limit an individual to only one term on the board―while allowing that individual to rotate through the offices of vice president and then president for a single term before "retiring". This encourages a variety of owners with a range of viewpoints to serve on the board. However, when the same individuals remain on the board for more than a single 3-year term, disinterest on the part of other owners generally results. Likewise, when the same individuals continue to be chosen by one another to remain in the same officer positions for more than a single 1-year term―a lack of transparency inevitably results. When a board hires a risk management company and a risk management attorney at the expense of the other 95% of owners, it does so in order to provide its 5% of owners with guidance on avoiding personal liability, i.e., legal protection against the risk of malfeasance in office. Said another way, the board is looking after its own interest at the expense of the general membership. The risk management company and risk management attorney always serve the interests of the board first―the membership at large coming in a distance second, even though they are paying 95% of the risk management costs on behalf of the 5% board. One of the typical byproducts of having a risk management company and a risk management attorney on the payroll of a board is a gross excess of administrative rules, most of which are redundant to the already existing provisions of the Association Management Documents―or have little or no basis in the controlling Association Management Documents (the latter erroneously referred to as "governing" documents). By state law (RCW 64.34), the controlling Association Management Documents are first 1) the Declaration and secondly 2) the Bylaws (the Bylaws being required to have as their sole basis the Declaration). Also be aware that the Declaration cannot conflict with state law. In other words, when in doubt―first go to RCW 64.34―and then refer to the Declaration. After that, refer to the Bylaws. If you find that any administrative rule conflicts with or does not conform to RCW 64.34 and/or the Declaration―then said conflicting and/or nonconforming administrative rule is not enforceable. You should become conversant with the Declaration, as well as with the state law, i.e., RCW 64.34. Remember this! Unlike the lawfully recorded and therefore legally effective Declaration and Bylaws, administrative rules do not require a vote of the association membership―but rather only a vote of the majority of the 5% board. Neither do administrative rules require lawful recordation in order to be effective. When there is such a gross excess of rules, they (the rules) in turn spawn a gross excess of time consuming rules enforcement. The latter then results in a gross excess of monetary fines. In the end, the gross overuse of risk management company letters and accompanying fines cause 95% of the membership to be resentful of the 5% board―as well as disinterested in attending (or participating in) board meetings and annual association membership meetings. Of course, when the 5% of the membership sitting on the board becomes―like most entrenched "governing" bodies―detached from the remaining 95% of owners, the board simply becomes increasingly insulated from reality as time goes along. This leads to abuse of authority (and a lack of transparency)―authority which should always be exercised on behalf of "the 95%" and not solely for the benefit of "the 5%". In summary, a board's overconfidence as the result of an overdependence on a risk management company and a risk management attorney―plus a board's overdependence on a gross excess of administrative rules and associated fines―inevitably leads to abuse of authority and a lack of transparency (as well as gross negligence). In the end, the paradox of said overconfidence and overdependence is that when push comes to shove―the risk management company and risk management attorney avoid their own risks by simply disassociating themselves from the board. Like all those who seek to gain self-protective traction by engaging risk management companies and risk management attorneys―a condominium board one day discovers that its members have been disengaged to the point of spinning their wheels. What are the indicators of such disengagement? The best answer is this: "when those whom the board has engaged stop answering the phone, stop returning phone calls and otherwise stop responding." That's when the board should have the common sense to be acutely aware that it has been "engaged" in gross negligence. |
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